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Abstract
We consider the product and process innovation effort decisions a sustainable (eco) man-
ufacturer (innovator/leader) makes in the presence of a traditional manufacturer (imita-
tor/follower) who may procure a license or imitate innovation. While product development
can be easily protected by patenting and licensing, process innovation is more difficult to
protect. We find that the ignoring the potential of process imitation reduces profits for
the innovating firm as the follower favors all-or-nothing imitation and many equilibrium
strategies, from the leader’s perspective, are to deter copycatting behavior. We also show
the eco-innovator may lose its competitive advantage through licensing its product innova-
tion; moreover, licensing may result in more imitation. Lastly, we glean further insights by
characterizing the equilibrium strategies with respect to cost-related factors.
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1. Introduction
Eco-innovation, as defined by the European Union in its Entrepreneurship and Innova-
tion Programme (EuropeanUnion, 2008), is “any form of innovation aiming at significant and
demonstrable progress towards the goal of sustainable development. This can be achieved
either by reducing the environmental impact or achieving a more efficient and responsible
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use of resources.” Further, eco-innovation “will . . . produce quality products with less envi-
ronmental impact, whilst innovation can also include moving towards more environmentally
friendly production processes and services.” In addition to having government programs
to promote and sustain eco-innovation, there is market demand for sustainability and envi-
ronmentally friendly products driven by not only risk and regulatory compliance but also
consumer awareness (Adams, 2014), companies are beginning to incorporate sustainability as
a feature into their product or process innovations. For example, Zara, the Spanish company
investing in “fast fashion” and the world’s largest clothing retailer, committed to eliminate
the release of hazardous chemicals from its manufacturing processes following intensive public
pressure and signed a safety agreement after the death of 1,127 as a result of a building col-
lapse in Bangladesh (Campbell, 2013; Greenpeace, 2012). Identifying that helping customers
to reduce their carbon impact as a priority, Siemens, introduced an environmental portfolio
of green products and services, which generated e 32.3 billion, 43% of the company’s total
revenue, and cut customers’ CO2 emissions by 377 million metric tons (Siemens, 2014). Be-
side the goals of better non-financial (environmental, social and governance) outcomes, such
eco-innovations are also driving strong financial performance in many ways through revenue
enhancement and cost reduction (Bonini and Swartz, 2014; Przychodzen and Przychodzen,
2015). According to Eccles et al. (2014), highly-sustainable companies did better in both
organizational processes and performance than other companies. Porter and Kramer (2006)
advise that, when approached strategically, corporate social responsibility, more than just a
cost or constraint, can generate opportunity, innovation, and a competitive advantage. For
example, Toyota’s hybrid-engine Prius was the company’s early response to public concern
about auto emission and later became the market leader in hybrid technology (Zapata and
Nieuwenhuis, 2010).
However, as companies develop new sustainable initiatives to grow their market and
market share by responding to customers’ needs, they must address licensing their products
and responding to copycat firms (Bhupendra and Sangle, 2016). Some firms may choose
not to issue a license for their innovation in order to build a competitive advantage and
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stifle competition if they have the manufacturing and marketing capability to the developed
technology, for example DuPont sued Monsanto over infringement of patents for producing
seeds that can withstand environmental stress (Decker and Kaskey, 2011). On the other
hand, firms may choose to keep their innovation a trade secret especially if the innovation is a
process that may be difficult to protect (Moore and Ausley, 2004; Teece, 1986; Young, 2001).
For example, in the chemical industry, including consumer products like Clorox’s Green
Works detergents (Glazer, 2012) and WD-40 (Bounds, 2006), process innovation is typically
kept as a trade secret (Maréchal, 2013). Regardless of the way innovation is protected,
patented or kept a trade secret, firms must deal with copycat products. For example, in
2012, Nike sued Adidas for patent infringement over knit-style sneakers, whose manufacturing
process produces 66% less waste than traditional methods (Townsend, 2012). In the past,
many companies copied and succeeded: e.g., Apple imitated others’ products but made their
iPod, iPhone, and iPad more appealing from both hardware and software perspectives; and
fast-fashion firms grow by copying innovations from the catwalk (The Economist, 2012).
The copycat followers have lower research-and-development (R&D) costs and bear less risk
of market failure, which give them advantages over market pioneers (Golder and Tellis,
1993). According to Shenkar (2010a), the often overlooked and despised imitation can be
more important to business growth than innovation as nearly 98% of the value generated by
innovations is captured by the copycats. However, imitation is not just mindless repetition
but rather requires strategic planning. Therefore, companies should smartly use it to gain a
strategic edge (Shenkar, 2010b).
In this paper we consider a sustainable (eco) manufacturer that will exert effort into
process and product eco-innovation. Note that as defined by the European Union (Euro-
peanUnion, 2008), eco-innovation may result in “more environmentally friendly production
processes” in addition to new “products with less environmental impact”. Given the Euro-
pean Union definition of eco-innovation, we say that process eco-innovation is any developed
business or manufacturing process that is more environmentally friendly, and we say that
product eco-innovation is any developed product that has less environmental impact, relative
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to what was previously available. Through the use of patents, a product eco-innovation can
be protected from copycats (enforceable). On the other hand, though not impossible, it
is more difficult to protect new processes from copycat competitors (unenforceable) Teece
(1986).1 Eco-innovation may result in a higher per-unit production cost for the innovating
manufacturer, but result in a larger market share for the innovator. In addition to being
more appealing to a marketplace, an innovating manufacturer may receive government sub-
sidy, from programs similar to those run by the European Union, to make its product or
process more sustainable, potentially resulting in increased profits. However, with the loom-
ing threat of having any developed process or product imitated, the innovative manufacturer
must take these opposing forces into account before making any innovation decisions. The
rival manufacturer must also consider how much of any developed process or product to copy
when improving its manufacturing process or product line.
In order to better understand the opposing forces of increased market growth due to
innovation and the cost of innovation and copycat products, in this paper we model the in-
teractions between a sustainable (innovative) and a traditional (copycat) manufacturer when
both need to make production, research and development effort decisions, and technology
transfer decisions. In this setting, we show that the potential of copycatting can be a threat
but not always, and it might be deterred. In addition, we show that the presence of copy-
catting results in an across the board reduction in eco-innovation of all types. We also find
that licensing eco-innovation may not benefit the innovator when substantial competitive
advantage can be built through new sustainable product development, and it may further
induce imitation. Lastly, our numerical studies show that cost characteristics play a key
role in strategic innovation and imitation, especially when more proactive strategies, like
monopoly and deterrence, are considered.
In the remainder of the paper we first discuss related work in Section 2. We then present
our model in Section 3, followed by our analysis in Section 4. We present numerical studies,
in which we show our results graphically, in Section 5, and conclude the paper in Section 7.
1Personal communication with university patent officer
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2. Related Work
In the extensive review by Kleindorfer et al. (2005), it is noted that sustainability has
gained momentum in the field of operations management (OM) in the last three decades.
Green product development and sustainable process design aim to integrate environmental
and social outcomes with economic outcomes, the triple bottom lines (social, environmental,
and financial), instead of trading off the three outcomes. However, as indicated by Tang
and Zhou (2012), extant studies on environmental measures focus mostly on government
regulations while the effect of market forces is largely ignored. With consumers becoming
more conscious of environmental issues, their preferences and response as well as the resulting
market competition will play a more important role in determining firms’ investment in
sustainability (Kikuchi-Uehara et al., 2016). Alwi et al. (2014) review a selection of papers
that aim to provide guidelines on sustainable engineering and innovations. Since these works
do not consider direct competition, our model complements this strain of the literature by
introducing a rival who may procure a license and imitate the eco-initiatives of the innovative
firm. Our modeling framework of asymmetric competition reflects the need suggested by
another recent review paper (Brandenburg et al., 2014). Li et al. (2017) point out that most
research separates eco-innovation into eco-process and eco-product innovation (Chang, 2011;
Cuerva et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014; Rennings and Rammer, 2011; Schiederig et al., 2012).
We add to this stream of literature by proposing an analytical model as to how an eco-
innovating firm best responds to the threat of imitation and providing insights into behavior
that may not be directly observed through surveys or publicly available data sets.
In terms of the adoption of innovation in OM, Shane and Ulrich (2004) find most of the
literature (Chen and Chang, 2010; Loch and Huberman, 1999) assumes diffusion models,
which also resonate strongly with the Industrial Organization R&D stream of literature
in economics (Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998). However, they mostly considered what
incentives need to be given such that firms become more innovative, which in turn leads
to higher social welfare. Unlike these works, we do not consider the types of incentives
that should be given to stimulate economic growth over time. Instead, we assume these
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incentives to be exogenously given and study the dynamics between a eco-innovator and
a traditional imitator in a Stackelberg setting. Specifically, we consider the R&D decisions
made by the innovative leader, and subsequently the post-innovation decisions, licensing and
imitation, made by the follower. Though a firm’s innovation strategy can focus on product,
process, or both, Arundel and Kabla (1998); Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) found that
product innovation is more likely to be patented as infringement is easier to detect. On the
other hand, patenting process innovation is less likely to enforceable and hence secrecy is
a more appropriate protection mechanism for this type of innovation (Cohen et al., 2000).
The spillover (externality) of innovation we consider is unidirectional, from the sustainable
manufacturer to the traditional manufacturer, which is consistent with the finding by Knott
et al. (2009) that spillovers have directionality and differ across firms through an empirical
study in the banking industry. Work on licensing, such as that by Avagyan et al. (2014);
Kamien et al. (1992); Katz and Shapiro (1987), looks at why firms license and when they
should enter licensing agreements and consider external incentives, such as product diffusion.
We do not consider these external incentives and only consider profit that is derived from
issuing a licensing agreement. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first considering
the follower can procure part of a license and partially imitate the leader’s innovations, and
the leader can use patents to enhance the revenue of the innovation or deter the follower’s
imitation through strategic investments.
3. Model
As illustrated in Figure 1 we consider a three-stage model of innovation and imitation
in which a traditional manufacturer, T , and a sustainable manufacturer, S, engaging in
Cournot competition within the same retail market. Thus the market-clearing price before
research and development decisions is p = m − qS − qT with a base market size, m, similar
to that of Du et al. (2016); Shamir and Shin (2015); Wang and Wang (2015).
Stage 1: S determines the efforts into research and development for the sustainable product




c , respectively, similar to the quadratic
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Figure 1: Pictorial representation of game dynamics
cost functions of Atasu and Subramanian (2012); Gao et al. (2016); Wang and Wang
(2015)., as well as the per-unit licensing fee, λ, to charge. These innovation efforts
increase S’s market size by Id+ Ic to m+ Id+ Ic, and reduce T ’s to m− Id− Ic, if there
is no licensing and imitation, similar to the switching effect due to a firm violating
its corporate social responsibility in Chen and Slotnick (2015); Guo et al. (2013). As
noted by Haines (1964), the market response to innovation need not be linear but
“a linear model is often close enough over the relevant range to the shape of the
curve usually encountered to serve for practical purposes.” Acemoglu and Linn (2004)
found a similar linear relationship for pharmaceutical innovation. Sustainable process
innovation may also increase (decrease) per-unit production cost c by βIc for positive
(negative) adjustment factor β, which is similar to that of Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006);
Ceccagnoli (2005); D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
Stage 2: Given S’s innovation efforts and licensing fee, T determines the fraction of the sus-
tainable product and process innovations to license and copy from S into its business,
θd ∈ [0, 1] and θc ∈ [0, 1], respectively. As new products can legally be protected using
patents, the traditional manufacturer must pay a proportional licensing fee, θdλ, which
we discuss in greater detail shortly. On the other hand, though new processes may be
patentable, identifying a process patent infringement is very difficult, which renders
patenting process innovations ineffective (Peeters and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,
2006; Teece, 1986). Thus, we assume S does not patent nor license its newly developed
processes, but all developed processes are subject to T ’s imitation (Ceccagnoli, 2005;
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) at a copying cost of θcγcT Ic and a unit production
cost increase (or saving) θcβIc, proportional to the imitation level θc ∈ [0, 1]. Similar
to the negative yet prevalent cross-investments to alter a rival’s demand in Arya and
Mittendorf (2013) and the lobbying effort to offset the market share loss in Kraft et al.
7
(2013), here both licensing and imitation mitigate T ’s disadvantage to S’s innovations,
m− (1− θd)Id and m− (1− θc)Ic, respectively. That is, both S and T ’s market shares
stay the same as m if T procures the full license and completely copies the sustainable
process innovations since m± (1− 1)Id ± (1− 1)Ic = m.
Stage 3: After research and development, licensing and copying decisions are made, both
manufacturers, S and T , simultaneously determine their production quantities, qS and
qT , respectively.
Except for the seven decisions on investment, copying and production quantities, we
assume the net marginal costs, γd, for product investments and, γcS and γcT , for process
investments for S and T respectively as well as the change in production cost, β, are given
and fixed. These values incorporate any government incentives or subsidies that exist for
eco-innovation. Putting these parameters and decisions variables together we write the
sustainable manufacturer’s profit function as:
ΠS(qS|θd, θc, λ, Id, Ic) = [m+(1−θd)Id+(1−θc)Ic−qS−qT ]qS+θdλqT−[(c+βIc)qS+γdI2d+γcSI2c ],
(1)
and the traditional manufacturer’s profit function as:
ΠT (qT |θd, θc, λ, Id, Ic) = [m−(1−θd)Id−(1−θc)Ic−qS−qT ]qT−θdλqT−[(c+θcβIc)qT+θcγcT I2c ].
(2)
We now examine the profit function for sustainable manufacturer in greater detail. The first
three terms of S’s market-clearing price in (1), m + (1 − θd)Id + (1 − θc)Ic, represent the
effective market size after S’s eco-innovation efforts (Id, Ic), which may be offset by rival T ’s
licensing and imitation levels (1−θd, 1−θc). Beside the sales revenue, S may also earn extra
θdλqT from licensing its production innovation to T . We highlight the fact that we also allow
for partial licensing, as opposed to all or nothing licensing by allowing θd ∈ [0, 1]. We are
not the first to suggest a continuum of licensing decisions as this is carried out by Mukherjee
(2010) and Rockett (1990) to account for the quality of the product that is licensed, and
by Bourreau et al. (2007) to model modular products, products made of a collection of
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components, such as a computer. As commonly used in this stream of literature (Bourreau
et al., 2007; Rockett, 1990), we assume the partial licensing decisions between the two firms
are made sequentially. The cost term consists of variable cost for production as well as fixed
costs for product and process innovations. We note that in our model, c+βIc, β ∈ R, reflects
the change in the unit production cost as a result of process innovation. In contrast to the
R&D literature in the field of Industrial Organization, which focuses on the cost-reducing
effect and thus restricts β to be negative, we allow β to take both positive and negative
values to account for the fact sustainable process innovation may increase production cost,
something that may be compensated by growth in market size (Nidumolu et al., 2009; Stefan
and Paul, 2008). For the traditional manufacturer T , the effects of S’s innovations on market
share are opposite and mitigated by its licensing and imitation, which results in the licensing
payment to S and imitation cost.
As both c and m are constants for ease of exposition in the remainder of the manuscript
we define a = m− c as in Arya and Mittendorf (2013) and rewrite (1) and (2) as:
ΠS(qS|θd, θc, λ, Id, Ic) = [a+(1−θd)Id+(1−θc)Ic−qS−qT−βIc]qS+θdλqT−γdI2d−γcSI2c (3)
ΠT (qT |θd, θc, λ, Id, Ic) = [a− (1− θd)Id− (1− θc)Ic− qS − qT − θcβIc− θdλ]qT − θcγcT I2c (4)
A feature of our model, is the product and process imitation fractions, θd and θc, the
traditional, T , manufacturer determines. As shown in (3) and (4), these fractions have an
impact on the innovation costs, market size, and licensing fees transferred between the two
manufacturers. In particular, the lower the θd and θc values, the higher the differentiation
between the sustainable and traditional manufacturers. Table 1 summarizes the notation
used in the model.
4. Analysis
Duopoly Cases
We use backward induction to solve S’s investment problem: we first find the optimal qS
and qT , then use the updated profit function for T to solve for the optimal product licensing
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Table 1: Model Notation
Symbol Definition
Id Effort for sustainable product innovation
Ic Effort for sustainable process innovation
λ Per-unit licensing fee
θd Proportion of product license to procure; θd ∈ [0, 1]
θc Proportion of process innovation to copy; θc ∈ [0, 1]
qi Quantity sold by firm i; i ∈ {S, T}
γd Marginal cost of product investment
γci Marginal cost of process investment for firm i; i ∈ {S, T}
β Change of per-unit production cost
c Unit production cost
m Base market size
a = m− c
Πi Firm i’s profit function; i ∈ {S, T}
and process copying decisions, θ’s, and lastly solve for S’s optimal efforts, Id and Ic, and the
per unit licensing fee λ.
Given S’s efforts and licensing fee (Id, Ic, λ) as well as T ’s licensing and imitation levels
(θd, θc), the two manufacturers’ optimal quantity decisions can be determined by jointly solv-
ing the First-order Optimality Conditions (FOCs) of (3) and (4) for qS and qT respectively:
































Substituting the optimal qS and qT back in (4) yields T ’s payoff function in θd and θc
given S’s investment levels and licensing fee:


















It can be seen from (7) that both the levels of product licensing and process imitation have
impact on T ’s profit. With a higher level of licensing, T aims to reduce its competitive dis-
advantage in the marketplace to S’s new sustainable product; while with a higher imitation
level, T is able to reduce the negative (market-stealing) effect of S’s process innovation but
at a cost of exerting effort to copy the process, which may further increase the per unit pro-
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duction cost as well, depending on the sign of β. Continuing with our backward induction,
we solve for T ’s optimal θ values. The optimal θ’s decisions, however, can be shown to take
only extreme values, i.e., 0 or 1, though they may take any value on [0, 1]. This follows
from the fact that ΠT (θd, θc|λ, Id, Ic) is jointly convex in θd and θc for all R2 (Bazaraa et al.,
2006). It immediately follows that holding either θd or θc fixed, the value of the remaining
free variable that maximizes ΠT (θd, θc|λ, Id, Ic) over [0, 1]2 must be either 0 or 1. Iteratively
applying this observation leads to the following result.
Proposition 1.
(θd(λ, Id, Ic), θc(λ, Id, Ic)) =



























































All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
We find that T ’s licensing decision (θd) depends solely on the parameters related to
product innovation, that is, whether the licensing cost (λ) is high or not with respect to S’s
effort in product differentiation through innovation (Id): T procures the full license of S’s
product innovation if λ < 3
2
Id; and does not procure the license at all otherwise. T ’s copying
decision, however, depends on S’s effort in process innovation (Ic) with respect to the change
in production cost (β), marginal cost of mimicking (γcT ) and λ or Id: T tends to completely
imitate S’s process innovation under low innovation effort, low production cost increase (or
high production cost saving), or low marginal cost of copying process innovation. We note
that the licensing decision (either full or no licensing) further influences T ’s imitation decision
as the cutoffs on Ic are decreasing in licensing fee when licensing is desired but decreasing
in Id if no licensing is preferred. Imitation decision, on the other hand, does not affect the
licensing decision in any way.
Substituting (5), (6) and (8) in (3) yields four profit functions for S in λ, Id, and Ic
corresponding to each of the four (θd,θc) combinations (see (A.11) in Appendix). However,
two of the four scenarios never occur:
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between λ and I∗d implies θ
∗
d = 0.
Proposition 2 states that regardless of the licensing fee, S will always set I∗d such that
θ∗d = 0, thus T does not have any incentive to procure the license of S’s product innovation.
Not licensing to the rival is the optimal decision because T always procures the full license
of S’s product innovation if at all, which leaves S no advantage in product differentiation
but rather only the licensing fee revenue from T . Such full licensing behavior discourages
S’s product innovation investment, which in turn makes licensing less profitable than not
licensing to T . This result is consistent with early empirical findings that for firms with
complementary assets to R&D, i.e., marketing and manufacturing capability (like our firm S)
are less likely to license because of high patent effectiveness of product innovations (Arora and
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Teece, 1986), however unlike these studies we characterize the effect of R&D
licensing (or not) on imitation. Specifically, licensing not only loses some of S’s competitive
advantage in differentiating its product to T , but it also makes T more likely to imitate S’s







































then copycatting would occur so S’s effective market size remains the same as m and so does




, copycatting would not occur so S’s effective market size increases to m+ Id+ Ic
while T ’s reduces to m− Id − Ic since θd = θc = 0.
When the option of licensing is removed, only two cases remain: copycat and no copycat




































, and Π0S corresponds to the case in which θc = 0 while
Π1S represents the case of θc = 1. The two profit functions have the following structural
properties as shown in the lemma below:
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Lemma 1. Given any Id,
(i) Π0S(Id, Ic) > Π
1
S(Id, Ic) for all Ic > 0 if β < 3,
(ii) Π0S(Id, Ic) = Π
1
S(Id, Ic) at Ic = 0.
By bounding β < 3, which will be later shown irrelevant, Lemma 1 facilitates subsequent
analysis by establishing the following structural properties: 1) if an interior solution for the
no copycat case (θc = 0) is feasible (satisfying the boundary constraint, Ic ≥ Īc), then it is
indeed globally optimal since Π0S(I
∗
c ) ≥ Π0S(Ic) > Π1S(Ic), ∀Ic ∈ R+; 2) a boundary solution
(Ic = Īc) in the no copycat case (θc = 0) dominates that in the copycat case (θc = 1) since
Π0S > Π
1
S for all Ic including the boundary point; 3) corner solutions (Ic = 0) have the
same objective function value in both cases, Π0S(Id, 0) = Π
1
S(Id, 0); and 4) the no copycat
boundary solution (Ic = Īc when θc = 0) may be dominated by the copycat interior solution
(Ic < Īc when θc = 1). The lemma simplifies subsequent analysis by eliminating two possible
solutions, the copycat boundary solution (Ic = Īc) which is always dominated by the no
copycat boundary solution, and the copycat corner solution (Ic = 0) which is equivalent to
the no copycat corner solution.
For S’s optimal innovations, we first present the results in which T does not mimic S’s
process, i.e., θc = 0 that requires Ic ≥ Īc, as all three types of S’s solutions could be a global
optimum:

































if β2 ≤ β (No Process Innv.)
(11)
where H0 = 4
[

























































As noted in Proposition 3, three types of non-copycatting equilibrium could possibly oc-
cur: first, at low production cost increase from process innovation (β < β1), no copycatting is
the best strategy where S’s optimal process innovation (denoted I0Id and I
0I
c where superscript














is high enough (≥ Īc) that leaves T no incentive to copy; second, at a higher cost increase
(β1 ≤ β < β2), copycat-deterrence strategy should be adopted where S has to compromise
by making a higher investment level (= Īc) to deter T from copying as otherwise the interior
optimal investment would have enticed T to completely copy the process innovation; and
third, even without copycatting, no process innovation would occur if it would raise the
production cost significantly (β ≥ β2). As noted in Lemma 1, while the first and third types
of equilibrium, when attainable, are surely globally optimal, the copycat-deterrence strategy
may be sub-optimal if S is better off investing in process innovation but allowing copycatting
as the gain from cost-reducing innovation outweighs the loss to copycatting.
Proposition 4 (Copycatting). When copycatting is allowed, S’s optimal investment deci-













if β3 ≤ β < 0 (12)
where H1 = 4
[


















We first note that for S to allow T to totally copy its process innovation and negate its
advantage in differentiating itself since (1− θc)Ic = 0, the investment in process innovation
must result in a lower production cost (β < 0). Otherwise, the costly innovation effort
raises production cost yet has no positive effect on S’s demand. Second, copycatting may be
permitted in S’s optimal strategy if the savings in production are relatively small (β3 ≤ β <
0) since big savings would drive S to invest more, which in turn either deters or keeps T from
copying the innovation. Ultimately, if the potential savings are extremely large (β  β1),
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S’s investment in process innovation could be substantial enough to totally drive T out of
the market (q∗T < 0) and duopolist market degenerates to a monopolist market. Before
we analyze the monopoly case, we compare our copycatting and non-copycatting results to
derive further insights:
Corollary 1. If β < 0,





























Note that in the corollary and the following discussion, we restrict β to be negative to
have I1Ic > 0 so we can then examine the consequences of neglecting copycatting (I
0I
c for
β < 0 is sub-optimal against the optimal I0Ic ). The comparative statics, however, for the
non-copycatting scenario alone work for β < β1. Corollary 1(i) shows that T ’s copycatting
behavior makes S cautious about its easy-to-copy process development and thus reduces such
innovation (I1Ic < I
0I
c ) when the threat of imitation is present. In addition, imitation may also
lower protected, product, innovation (I1Id < I
0I
d ), which implies that the overall innovation by
S, (I1Id +I
1I
c ), shrinks due to copycatting. Interestingly, such complementary effects between
the two types of innovations are also observed when varying S’s cost parameters (β, γcS
and γd) as in part (ii). On the other hand, for either scenario, copycatting or not, T ’s cost
of imitation γcT does not influence S’s innovation decisions since T ’s copycatting decisions
are all or nothing decisions. However, γcT does influence which scenario would occur as
it implicitly affects β3, the threshold in β above which copycatting behavior is observed.
Though S’s two distinct types of innovation react to all parameters and T ’s copycatting
strategy in a similar fashion, the degree to which each reacts is different. As part (iii) shows
within either scenario, the ratio of S’s product to process innovation are increasing in its
marginal process innovation cost (γcS), and decreasing in the marginal product innovation
cost (γd) and per-unit production cost savings (−β). This is also true when examining the
effect on the ratio between the two scenarios (copycatting v.s. non-copycatting) as though
both innovations are negatively affected by imitation (from part (i)), copycatting discourages
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process innovation more and thus results in a higher product-to-process innovation ratio.
However, we find that the possibility of copycatting by T increases the sensitivity to process
innovation resulting in a larger ratio.
Monopoly Cases
In the case of monopoly, S’s profit function can be rewritten by removing qT , θd, λ, and
θc in (3):
ΠMS (qS|Id, Ic) = (a+ Id + Ic − qS − βIc)qS − γdI2d − γcSI2c (13)
The analysis of monopolistic setting is analogous to that under the duopolistic environ-
ment, and takes into account the two boundary scenarios, to deter either copycat entry or
non-copycat entry. We summarize the monopolistic results below:
Proposition 5 (Monopoly). For the monopolistic S, its optimal investment decisions can























if β5 ≤ β < β6 (Noncopycat-entry deterrence)
(14)








































It is first noted that monopolistic cases occur only at low and negative β’s, i.e., cost-
reducing process innovation. The monopolistic cutoffs β4, β5, or β6 are much smaller, in
absolute value terms, than the duopolistic cutoffs β1, β2, or β3. When β is extremely low
(between β0 and β4), the interior monopolistic investments are significant to keep T from
entering the market. At a higher β (β4 < β < β5), S loses some of its monopoly power as
it will not invest as much, which may give T the opportunity to copy its process innovation
and enter the market if not deterred by S through entry-deterrence investment strategy; on
the other hand, for even higher β (β5 < β < β6), S needs only to deter T ’s entry with no
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copying intention as copycatting is too costly for T . Lastly, for sufficiently high cost increase,
deterring the entry of T can be costly to S so duopolistic outcomes will prevail as shown in
earlier analysis.
Analysis Summary
We summarize the monopolistic and duopolistic equilibrium in Table 2. We note from the
Condition Equilibrium
β0 ≤ β < β4 Monopoly
β4 ≤ β < β5 Copycat Entry Deterrence
β5 ≤ β < β6 Non-copycat Entry Deterrence
β6 ≤ β < β1 No Copycat Duopoly
β1 ≤ β < min{β2, β3} Copycat Deterrence Duopoly
β3 ≤ β < 0 Copycat Duopoly
max{0, β2} ≤ β No Investment Duopoly
Table 2: A summary of the equilibrium.
table that if not considered by an innovator, copycatting may lead to reduced profits, but not
in all cases. When β, the post-innovation production cost change, is sufficiently low (between
β0 and β4), as a monopolist the innovator need not consider copycatting. However, when β
is just a little higher, β ∈ [β4, β5), copycatting must be taken into account to deter the entry
of an imitator. Interestingly, as β further increases to [β5, β1), the impact of copycatting
needs not to be considered again since the optimal strategies are to deter or compete with
non-copycat entrant. These non-contiguous regions of β mean that an innovating firm should
be wary of copycat firms, but not always and imitation may be deterred.
Thus far, we categorize the equilibrium types based on the post-innovation production
cost change, β. However, since the β cutoffs at which the equilibrium type changes are
functions of other investment parameters, γd, γcS and γcT , we further examine the interaction




Having completed the analysis of the duopolistic game between S and T as well as the
monopolistic analysis for S, in this section we use numerical studies to further explore how
S should strategically invest in response to its process-related costs (γcS and β), marginal
product vs. process innovation costs (γd and γcS), and T ’s vs. S’s marginal process innovation
cost (γcT and γcS). We would like to note and leave out the discussion of product-related
innovation decision as it has been shown analytically that S should never issue licenses for

































Figure 2: Equilibrium in S’s process innovation cost and production cost change
Let γd = 6 and γcT = 2, Figure 2 first confirms the earlier analytical results regarding
how the process investment decision is affected by the production cost change (−1 ≤ β ≤
1 where a negative value corresponds to production cost reduction): for instance, when
faced with intermediate marginal cost for process innovation (4 ≤ γcS ≤ 5), the duopolistic
outcomes would transit from non-copycat, copycat deterrence, to no investment as β increases
(Proposition 3); for high marginal cost (γcS ≥ 7), it may be too costly to deter T from copying
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the innovation so allowing copycatting may still prove beneficial if sufficient production
cost savings can be made (Proposition 4); for either low marginal innovation cost or high
production cost saving (small γcS or β), as Proposition 5 depicts, monopolistic outcomes
prevail. It is worth noting that in terms of monopolistic deterrence strategies, the monopolist
S would have to exert more effort to deter copycat entry when β is low (< −0.7) and non-
copycat entry when β takes values in the middle of the considered range. Interestingly,
though S’s two process-related factors, γcS and β, are mostly substitutes in determining the
optimal strategy (the same equilibrium type remains when one parameter increases while
the other decreases for the most part of Figure 2), T ’s entry decision is mainly influenced by
the production cost change (β) as seen from the two straight vertical β cutoffs of the copycat
entry deterrence and copycat equilibrium types (at β = .65 and β = 0, respectively).
We next explore the tradeoff between S’s two innovation costs, γd vs. γcS. To isolate
the effect of β on process innovation, we assume β = 0 so that there is no production cost
change.




















(a) β = 0 < β5 (with γcT = 0.5)


























(b) β = 0 ≥ β5 (with γcT = 3)
Figure 3: Equilibrium in S’s marginal product and process innovation cost
As is clear from Figure 3, whether T copies S’s innovation depends on its marginal
process innovation cost γcT , which in turn determines if β > β5. When the cost for copying
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is relatively cheap (Figure 3(a)), we find T has the incentive to enter the market even though
it would not save any production costs (β = 0) but negates the loss of market to S (θc = 1);
on the other hand, T has no interest in copying S’s process if the process innovation cost is
high (Figure 3(b)). In both cases, however, the equilibrium regions are nearly symmetric to
S’s two marginal innovation costs, γd and γcS. This implies that with no effect on production
cost changes, the two costs are close substitutes to each other. Lastly, we examine the relative
process development costs between S and T .

























Figure 4: Equilibrium in T ’s and S’s marginal process innovation costs (γd = −0.5 and β = −0.5)
Since γcS is the true innovation cost while γcT is the copying cost, it may be reasonable
to assume γcS ≥ γcT and therefore we only focus on the lower-right triangle of Figure 4. It is
notable that when the cost is high for S to innovate while low for T to copy, S has no choices
but to let T copy which offsets some of its savings from production cost reduction because of
negative β (the upper-right corner would be “no process innovation” if β > 0). On the other
hand, when the costs are relatively the same for both the innovator and copycat (45-degree
diagonal line), then S should be more aggressive and leave T no incentive to copy.
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6. Discussion
In this section we discuss some managerial takeaways from our work as well as some
natural extensions one may consider of the proposed model.
6.1. Summary of Results and Implications
Copycatting behavior may be a threat but not always, and it might be deterred. We show
that though mostly overlooked in the literature of innovation, imitation like licensing should
be of strategic importance for both the eco-innovator and traditional imitator as copycat-
related equilibria are fairly commonly observed (Figures 2-4). This finding is consistent with
earlier empirical and case studies that find that most value of innovation is captured by the
copycats (Shenkar, 2010a). Our results suggest that not only should the traditional firm
imitate strategically (Proposition 1), the sustainable firm should also take rival’s potential
imitation behavior into consideration before carrying out any innovations (Propositions 4
and 5). However, the threat of imitation may not always be credible, and imitation might be
deterred through strategic innovation management (Table 2 and Figure 2). In addition, we
find that imitation leads to an across the board reduction in innovation (Corollary 1). One
potential takeaway from this is that a regulatory body may want to provide additional incen-
tives for innovation in order to curtail the threat of innovation imitation. Specifically, when
eco-innovation can lead to cost savings, the innovator may tolerate imitation (Proposition 4).
For example, Apple was among the first companies, but the only smartphone maker, to start
the Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP) (Conflict-Free-Sourcing-Initiative, 2016),2 which
benefits late participants from the smartphone industry. Compared to regular member com-
panies like Samsung, that pay only small membership fees, an initiator like Apple had to
provide substantial initial funding. However, joint efforts with large firms from other in-
dustries (like GE, HP, Intel and Microsoft) saves Apple tremendous amount of money when
engaging in auditing tasks of shared suppliers, with firms via the CFSP.
2The CFSP program was started in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Reform Act to ensure manufacturers
used conflict-free materials. The program shares supply chain auditing costs across multiple industries to
ensure compliance with the act.
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Licensing eco-innovation may do more harm than good to the innovator and further induce
imitation of its unprotected, process, innovation. Though many companies, including start-
up and mature firms, use licensing extensively to generate revenue and recoup development
cost from their innovations, we show that licensing sustainable product innovation deprives
the sustainable manufacturer of the competitive advantage in product differentiation, and
licensing is always undercompensated from the appropriated rents (Proposition 2). Our
finding is in line with the empirical and case studies (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Teece, 1986)
that licensing is not recommended if the innovator possesses complementary manufacturing
and marketing assets. In addition, by incorporating two distinct types of innovations and
the possibility of a copycat, our results extend earlier studies by understanding the effect of
holding back licensing on a rival’s copycatting behavior. We show that holding all else equal,
not licensing patented innovation to build a differentiated product and thus stronger brand
also helps reduce the possibility of copycatting (Proposition 1). In fact, Siemens in their 2015
Annual Report stated that their R&D activities lead to innovative and sustainable solutions
that safeguard their competitiveness by holding 56,200 granted patents worldwide (Kaeser
and Busch, 2015). Our results suggest Siemens should keep most patents themselves and
not license to direct competitors in order to sustain the leadership in eco-innovations and
discourage potential imitators.
In summary, our analytical and numerical results illustrate that the optimal (equilibrium)
innovation strategy is sensitive to various cost-related factors, including per unit production
cost change, marginal product and process innovation costs, and marginal imitation cost
(Table 2 and Figures 2-4). No single factor dominates the others and there exist strong
interactions among factors that jointly determine the optimal innovation strategy. It is also
important to highlight that innovation should not be treated equally and independently
as we show enforceable, patents, and unenforceable, trade secret, innovation efforts have
opposing impacts on a competitor’s copycat decisions (Propositions 3-5). All of these factors
must be balanced carefully by an innovating firm, and the type of innovation, product
(enforceable) or process (unenforceable), must also be distinguished in developing its eco-
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innovation strategy. When used properly, a proactive strategy may keep the follower from
imitating eco-innovation, or even deter the entrance altogether and thus give the leader
monopolistic power.
6.2. Model Limitations and Future Work
In the presented work, the marginal innovation costs have incorporated any government
incentives, which are all set a priori. A natural extension to the presented work is to include
the government as third player in the game, interested in driving an entire industry sector to
adopt sustainable manufacturing practices. Though in the presented work a government can
perform sensitivity analysis given any set of incentives, finding the equilibrium incentives is of
importance to see how sustainable innovations can benefit society as a whole. In addition, we
assumed that the production cost and market size are the same for both the sustainable and
traditional firms, referred to as symmetric production costs. In a preliminary exploration,
we note that even with asymmetric production costs, a traditional firm will still choose
all or nothing licensing and copying decisions. However, imitation is more likely to occur
when the production cost is lower for the traditional firm, which puts its sustainable rival
in an even more disadvantageous position relative to the symmetric case. In the future,
further exploring model parameter asymmetry between the two firms may be of interest to
allow better understanding to the best decisions for both firms. Further, we would also like to
incorporate consumer response to different products, for example some customers may prefer
traditional products as opposed to sustainable products. Considering a heterogeneous set of
customers, it is interesting to determine if there are settings in which it is optimal to offer
both sustainable and traditional products, regardless of government incentives. Also, it may
be insightful to study how competition affects the equilibrium outcome, such as an oligopoly
settings where multiple innovators and imitators coexist and may collaborate in innovations.
These market structure extensions may bridge the findings to those of the diffusion models
which assume some pooled innovation spillovers. Lastly, another possible reason to take
copycatting seriously is that it may be required to make an impactful innovation, as discussed
by Steve Jobs regarding the impactful Apple Macintosh:
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“Picasso had a saying, he said, ‘Good artists copy. Great artists steal.’ And we
have always been shameless about stealing great ideas.” (Jobs, 1994)
7. Conclusion
While most extant R&D literature in operations management focuses on cost-reducing
innovation, many companies these days invest in costly innovations that do not necessarily
reduce production cost but rather aim to increase its competitive advantage to traditional
manufacturers in the marketplace. However, though most product innovations can be pro-
tected by a patent and may generate additional revenue for firms through licensing, process
innovations, on the other hand, may be subject to the threat of imitation due to the dif-
ficulty of proving infringement. In this paper, we considered a sustainable manufacturer’s
decisions in product and process innovations, followed by a traditional manufacturer’s deci-
sions whether to procure the license and/or copy the innovations. We think that our results
are of use to not only managers, as discussed in Section 6, but we also make a contribution
to the sustainable innovation literature by incorporating the impact of various innovation
effort types on the optimal licensing the copying decisions by each firm.
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Appendix. Proofs





≥ 0 and |∇2ΠT | = 0 where
























ΠT is positive semi-definite, which implies corner optimal solutions: θd = {0, 1} and θc =
{0, 1}. That is, T either fully licenses the new product innovation or not licenses at all, and
same is true regarding whether to copy the process innovation or not. The corresponding
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profit function for each corner solution are as follows:
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To derive the conditions for each solution, we compare the gain/loss when T switches from
θd = 1 to θd = 0 and from θc = 1 to θc = 0:
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− 2Id − Ic
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− γcT I2c (A.9)






























































Here all we are doing is for each of the components of (8), we solve for a pair of equations
(A.6)-(A.9) being > 0 or < 0. For example, for (1,1) being optimal, implies that (A.6) > 0
and (A.8) > 0 solving these equations we have the condition on (1,1) For (1,0) being optimal,
we have (A.7) > 0 and (A.8) < 0, etc.
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Proof of Proposition 2.

























































































For the first two cases of (A.11) in which θd = 1,
∂ΠS(λ, Id, Ic)
∂Id
= −2γdId ≤ 0 (A.12)
This implies S would never invest more than 2λ
3
in product innovation so θd = 0 and T would
never license the product at all (λ = 0 or could be any number since it is irrelevant).




















+ Id − β3 Ic
)]
>
0 iff (if and only if) β < 3 since the two terms in the square brackets represent quantities
(non-negative) in the associated cases (θc = 0 and θc = 1). Π
0
S(Id, Ic) − Π1S(Id, Ic) = 0 if
Ic = 0.

















































To ensure S’s profit function is negative definite, it requires the following SOCs (Second-
order Optimality Conditions): γd > 1 and H
0 ≡ |∇2Π0S| = 4
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where the superscript 0I indicates Interior solution for the case of θc = 0. Note that I
0I
c > 0
iff β < 3
2
; otherwise, if β > 3
2





I0Cc = 0 (A.18)
In addition, for feasibility, I0Id and I
0I
c must satisfy the condition for which θc = 0, i.e., Ic > Īc,


































































































































To ensure S’s profit function is negative definite, it requires the following SOCs: γd > 1,
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H1 ≡ |∇2Π1S| = 4
[





> 0 =⇒ γcS > β
2γd
9(γd−1)
Jointly solving for the FOCs
















































true when β < 0.









































2 are clearly all decreasing in β (for negative β), γcS and γd,
but independent of γcT .
(iii) The first part follows directly by dividing Id with Ic in Propositions 4 and 3 respectively;
the second part holds if −β < 3− 2β, which is true when β < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. For S to drive T out of the market, the individual rationality (IR)
conditions on (7), ΠT (θc|IMd , IMc ) ≤ 0, must hold under the duopolistic setting (q∗S and q∗T as
characterized in (5) and (6) respectively).










− θcγcT (IMc )2 ≤ 0 (A.25)
which leads to the following two conditions:















Note that ĪM1c > Ī
M0






≡ β5. Therefore, to deter T ’s entry whether
copying or not, S’s investment must satisfy:
IMc ≥ max{ĪM1c , ĪM0c } = ĪM1c if β < β5 (A.26)
IMc ≥ max{ĪM1c , ĪM0c } = ĪM0c if β ≥ β5 (A.27)
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When the condition is satisfied, the optimal monopolistic quantity can be derived by solving
the FOC of (13) w.r.t. qS:
qMS (Id, Ic) =
a+ Id + (1− β)Ic
2
(A.28)
Substituting the optimal quantity in (13) yields S’s profit function in Id and Ic:
πMS (Id, Ic) =
(
a+ Id + (1− β)Ic
2
)2
− γdI2d − γcSI2c (A.29)













∣∣∇2πMS ∣∣ = 4γdγcS − γcS − γd(1 − β)2 > 0 ⇒ β > 1 − √ (4γd−1)γcSγd ≡ β0
when SOC holds. On the other hand, if the IR condition for T does not hold, then entry-




c depending on β. Substituting








γcT − 3 + 4β) + 12γcS
4γd(β + 3
√
γcT )2 + 36γcS − (3
√
γcT − 3 + 4β)2
if β < β5 (A.31)
IM0d = a ·
(2− β)β + 3γcS
(3− β)2γd + 9γcS − β2
if β ≥ β5 (A.32)





is the optimal investment decisions, can be obtained from ΠT (θc = 1|IMId , IMIc ) = 0 ; and




c ) is optimal, can
be obtained from q∗T (θc = 0|I0Id , I0Ic ) =
√
ΠT (θc = 0|I0Id , I0Ic ) = 0.
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